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Back to the roots of ARPANET and Internet History with Alexandre Serres 
Valérie Schafer, Sarah Cooper and Camille Paloque-Bergès  
 
 While Janet Abbate’s Inventing the Internet (1999) and Patrice Flichy’s The Internet 
Imaginaire,1 both contemporaries of Alexandre Serres’ thesis, have had a clear impact on the 
Anglo-American academic world and remain seminal in the historiography of the history of 
ARPANET and the Internet, the PhD “Aux sources d’Internet” (“The origins of the Internet”), 
defended in 2000, has remained less well known outside France.  
Produced within the fledgling discipline of Information and Communication Sciences and 
supervised by Christian Le Moënne and Jean-Max Noyer,2 this PhD research is, however, 
well known and recognised by specialists in France.  
Alexandre Serres3 was a lecturer in Information and Communication Sciences at URFIST4 in 
Rennes, which he has co-directed from 2002 to 2018. He has focused his career on topics that 
are of ongoing relevance for information practices, with a particular emphasis on three areas: 
information cultures and transliteracy, information evaluation, and the study of researchers’ 
information practices. After his PhD, he has tended to concentrate less on the historical field, 
with the exception of his production with Valérie Schafer of an online anthology entitled 
“Histories of the Internet and the Web.5” But the results and conclusion of his thesis are still 
valid and justify a translation that will reach a broader audience than the French-speaking 
community.  
After a critical study of the narrative of ARPANET’s alleged military origins, the thesis seeks 
to highlight the uncertainty that characterises innovation as well as the multiplicity of 
temporalities at work in the emergence of ARPANET. This study intertwines the long process 
of ARPANET’s emergence through an examination of its diverse and multiple components 
(with a large part devoted to interactive computing and time-sharing) and the socio-technical 
networks they constitute, with a critical use of the translation model and a reflection on the 
history of information tools and on the difficulties of writing a “processual history.6”  
                                                
1 First written and published in French by Editions La Découverte (2001), then translated and published by MIT 
Press (2007). 
2 Alexandre Serres notes the key role played by the latter in his choice of topic: “I would first like to thank Jean-
Max Noyer, who initiated this journey and who, one day in autumn 1996, suggested that I change my destination 
after a false start (on a thesis topic that was quickly abandoned) and resume exploring the history of tools and 
information systems. This proposal resulted in a first chronology, “From Paul Otlet to the Internet,” which 
addressed the challenge of establishing the multiple and heterogeneous intersections involved in the emergence 
of our information tools” (p. 5). 
3 https://perso.univ-rennes2.fr/alexandre.serres 
4 “Regional Unit Training to Scientific and Technical Information.”   
https://www.sites.univ-rennes2.fr/urfist/ 
5  “Living Books about History” collection. http://www.livingbooksabouthistory.ch/fr/book/histories-of-the-
internet-and-the-web, Switzerland: InfoClio.ch, 2016. 
6 See the abstract of Serres’ original thesis manuscript: Alexandre Serres. Aux sources d’Internet: l’émergence 
d’ARPANET. Exploration du processus d’émergence d’une infrastructure informationnelle. Description des 
trajectoires des acteurs et actants, des filières et des réseaux constitutifs de la naissance d’ARPANET. Problèmes 
critiques et épistémologiques posés par l’histoire des innovations. [The origins of the Internet: the emergence of 
ARPANET. Exploring the emergence process of an information infrastructure. A description of the trajectories, 
the actors and agents, the sectors and networks that paved the way for the creation of ARPANET. Critical and 
epistemological problems posed by the history of innovation], Sciences de l’Homme et Société. Université 
Rennes 2, 2000. Français. <tel-00312005>  
We have chosen to introduce the reader to the final part of Serres’ research – an inevitable 
choice within the 600 pages of this work7 because it echoes other articles and interviews in 
this special issue by adopting a critical perspective based on the Actor-Network Theory –, 
within which, more specifically, the author refers to a “sociology of translation” approach. To 
start with, the ANT theoretical framework, based on a constructivist postulate, is key to 
positioning technical and scientific aspects, which are still often given a prominent place in 
discussions about Internet histories, in broader social contexts where people, culture and 
policies matter as much as machines and concepts. These concerns are explicitly conveyed by 
McKelvey and Driscoll in their article (in this issue) on the IMP as a boundary object, a 
concept in science and technology studies (STS) that resonates with ANT – extensively used 
by Serres himself to explain how ARPANET was at the intersection of the three worlds of 
science, business and the military (although opinions differed as to their relative importance). 
Other critical issues related to ANT and STS, such as re-assessing the role of individuals 
within research and innovation collectives, are raised in Morten Bay’s contribution (in this 
issue) about the packet switching dispute, as well as in the two interviews, one with 
ARPANET administrator Larry Roberts and the second with the two French ARPANET 
contributors Michel Élie and Gérard Le Lann. The latter interview also covers Cyclades and 
other French computer networking innovations and contributions that are mentioned in 
Serres’ work.  
Other parts of this ample analysis could obviously have been chosen. Those relating in 
particular to the importance of involving actors, of which RFCs are just one example, seem to 
us to be as fruitful as ever, almost 20 years later. The critical historiography of the Internet 
and ARPANET, analysed at the beginning of the thesis, is testament to the circulation in 
France of many seminal writings which laid the foundations for ARPANET’s official history, 
such as Netizens (1998) by Michael and Ronda Hauben, Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The 
Origins of the Internet (1998) by Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, and Howard Rheingold’s 
Virtual Communities (1993). But it also shows how a 1993 Master’s dissertation, now largely 
forgotten, by a student from the School of Communications at Grand Valley State University, 
Henry Edward Hardy, entitled The History of the Net, represented an important source for the 
first French writings on the Internet: “Thus Hardy’s work served as a historical reference for 
the first synthetic study published in France, Arnaud Dufour’s comprehensive Internet, in the 
collection Que sais-je?, the first edition of which was published in 1995. We will see later on 
just how important this bibliographical element was in disseminating the current 
interpretation of origins.8”  
But the starting point for Serres’ thesis was in wanting to take a stand against these commonly 
accepted interpretations, seen as too monolithic, and especially against the over-emphasis on 
military origins. In contrast with accounts along these lines by stakeholders and journalists, he 
recalls the first academic steps in researching the history of ARPANET, in particular the 
Conference on the History of the Internet organised by the Society for Social Studies of 
Science in October 1995 at the University of Virginia. Alexandre Serres had indirect access to 
its content thanks to the report by Geoffrey Bowker on three lectures, those by Judy O’Neill, 
Juan Rogers and Janet Abbate. He highlights the importance of researcher-conducted 
interviews, such as the interview carried out by Judy O’Neill for the Charles Babbage 
Institute. These interviews would come to constitute the main sources of his analysis:  
 
                                                
7 The full text is accessible in an open access archive: https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00312005. 
8 Our translation, from p. 24 of Serres’ original thesis manuscript.  
“Specifically concerning the emergence of ARPANET, the recording and dissemination, in 
paper or electronic form, of interviews with several dozen people involved in this history is 
one of the most crucial sources for any historical research. Unlike personal writings for the 
purposes of self-promotion or short interviews conducted by Internet users or journalists in a 
hurry, these are interviews from a long-term perspective, conducted by researchers specialised 
in the history of computer science (e.g. William Aspray, Artur Norberg and Judy O’Neill) 
[…]. With this type of document, we are leaving the realm of “organised memory” and 
celebration to enter, finally, into that of historical intelligibility […].9”  
 
Based on these sources, Alexandre Serres sought to show that the emergence of the 
ARPANET network was the result of a long innovation process lasting about fifteen years, 
involving a large number of actors from the American “military-scientific-industrial complex” 
and comprising various interwoven historical narratives (cybernetics, hypertext, interactive 
computing, packet switching transmission, time-sharing, the Cold War, etc.). By carefully 
following the cybernetic path, the socio-technical matrix of Whirlwind, SAGE and time-
sharing, the strategic role of the MAC project and the design, mobilisation and 
“irreversibility” phases of ARPANET, he offered a study that goes far beyond historical 
causality, even considered in all its complexity.  
 
Camille Paloque-Bergès and Valérie Schafer 
 
Translation of part of the conclusion of Alexandre Serres’ PhD on “The origins of the 
Internet: the emergence of ARPANET” : Lessons and unresolved questions about the 
history of Arpanet 
At the end of this long narrative, what lessons can be drawn from the history of ARPANET? 
What issues does this attempt to apply the sociology of translation to the history of 
information infrastructures raise? What (self-)critical observations can we make about our 
own approach? Have we succeeded in our gamble?  
This last part will attempt, if not to answer these three questions, at least to address them in all 
their complexity, in order to come back to our initial thoughts on the history of information 
systems. In the first part, we raised a difficult central question that now needs to be re-
examined: how can we develop a history of an “information infrastructure” of this type? How 
can we write a “processual” history about something as vast as the emergence of this 
computer network?  
First, let us note some obvious facts: the history that has been presented here is, of course, not 
the whole history, nor is it the only possible history, and it is certainly not the “true” history of 
the Internet’s ancestor.  
It is by no means a total history, a concept which by its very nature remains illusory. Since 
history is always a partition of reality, a choice of plot, the construction of a narrative, the 
history we have presented here, despite its apparent exhaustiveness, is no more than a 
selective, partial reading of a broad historical phenomenon that, by its dimensions, eludes any 
attempt at “totalisation.” We have shown only part of a protean innovation process.  
                                                
9 Our translation, from p. 46 of Serres’ original thesis manuscript.  
Our history is also, it must be remembered, only one of many possible histories. Multiple 
“points of view” allow several kinds of histories about the emergence of ARPANET, even if 
they reflect pre-established and relatively conventional divisions: technical, military, 
economic, cultural, social, political histories, etc. However traditional and limited (at least 
epistemologically) these particular points of view may be, they can give rise to highly 
valuable narratives and histories.  
We are thinking in particular of the value of a technical history of networks, which would 
attempt to piece together, from the point of view of tools and machines, the lengthy internal 
developments of the computer. A technical history of the Internet would have to get to the 
core of the history of computing, of which it is an essential branch, but also to explore the 
long history of remote communication technologies. This dual perspective is further enriched 
by a third dimension, that of knowledge and information tools, the development of a 
“technical/documentary” branch to which the Internet has been linked from Engelbart’s first 
hypertext systems to today's search engines. The technical history of Internet technologies, 
which stands at the crossroads of these three long-term historical paths, could prove to be 
highly relevant and fruitful. It would undoubtedly find its full legitimacy and would be of 
great interest if it could put into perspective the various processes and technical principles at 
work according to the concepts developed by Gilbert Simondon. If the “concretisation 
process” of the networked computer, i.e. the trend towards internal coherence of its functions 
and integration of its interfaces, could be described and analysed with as much rigour and 
attention to detail as that of the internal combustion engine was under Simondon’s scalpel, 
then our understanding and knowledge of the Internet would take a big step forward.  
But such a history, which requires thorough knowledge in two areas – the philosophy of 
techniques, and computer science and telecommunications –, far exceeds our capabilities, and 
our project was quite different. 
Finally, at the risk of sounding trivial, it is clear that under no circumstances have we sought 
to develop the “true” history of ARPANET: the search for truth or ultimate and definitive 
causes is not part of our approach, and while we advocate a rigorous commitment to the 
verification of reported facts (the most effective guarantee against all revisionism), our 
objective was to develop a history that is “truthful” rather than “true.”  
Five lessons to be drawn from this narrative of the emergence of ARPANET  
[…] We have identified at least five lessons that will enable us to readdress five key questions 
in the history of technological innovation: 
- the emergence of ARPANET cannot be reduced to one or more causes, which again raises 
the central question of historical causality; 
- while the innovation process was eminently collective, like all technical innovation, the role 
of individuals was no less decisive, and the interaction between the collective and the 
individual may need to be re-examined;  
- ARPANET trod the line between preparation and uncertainty: the entire emergence process 
can be seen as constantly oscillating between preparation and uncertainty, between planning 
and coincidence. The ambivalent nature of innovation processes seems to be a key issue;  
- ARPANET stands midway between a technical approach and the impact of stakeholder 
associations: to what extent do internal influences, the “technical trend,” come into play in 
innovation processes? Does the example of packet switching bring us back to technical 
determinism?  
- ARPANET and “Americanness:” was the first network specifically American? What role 
does cultural determinism play in innovation? 
By addressing each of these questions, we will try to critically review our approach.  
The illusory search for causality  
After describing the different processes that led to the emergence of the first computer 
network, are we in a position to answer this simple, recurring, irksome question: why 
ARPANET? Once we have got to grips with the how, are we finally able to understand the 
why, as we initially suggested?  
Unfortunately, it appears that we are not. Admittedly, a number of hypotheses have been 
ruled out: the project was not the result of the Cold War or the product of a military plan. And 
if our research has served at least to destroy this myth, it has not been in vain. Other 
explanations, other partly known avenues have been reinforced, confirmed and demonstrated 
by describing the processes: ARPANET was indeed born of a desire to share computing 
resources between researchers under contract with ARPA. This project for sharing 
information and resources drew on various factors, including the financial need to rationalise 
ARPA’s expenditures, the discourse of interactive computing and networks, the technical 
achievements of time-sharing, etc. But by exploring these different paths that take us to the 
origins of the process, have we actually been able to determine the root causes, the real 
reasons, which explain the birth of the network?  
[…] From the perspective of the sociology of translation, which we have adopted, the ultimate 
explanation for innovation lies in the strength of the links and networks established by the 
actors. ARPANET was able to be built because of the success of the translation processes 
undertaken by the various actors, because sufficiently strong links, solid networks, numerous 
allies and the resolution of controversial issues allowed it to emerge. A successful innovation 
can only come about as a result of strong association and translation processes, for which 
there is no secret cause. Describing these processes can admittedly highlight multiple local 
causalities, as we have seen (time-sharing, interactive computing, rationalisation, “ARPA 
style,” etc.). But none of these causes can claim, on its own, to encompass all the others; no 
explanation, however truthful, can really explain the success (or failure) of innovation, so 
long as it fails, as research on historical causes often does, to consider the countless 
mediations, platforms, processes, forces and actors, whose mobilisation and association are 
essential to establishing a valid, up-to-date understanding of this “causality.” In other words, 
claiming that ARPANET was “born of a desire to share computer resources” is certainly 
correct and true, but this “cause” does not help us to explain why the project was successful.  
[…] This almost obsessive search for “true causes” ultimately comes up against Paul Veyne’s 
strong objection: “The choice of narrative alone determines what will be causally relevant or 
not; science can make as much progress as it wants, but history will hold to its fundamental 
basis, according to which cause exists only through narrative.”10  
[…] Challenging the quest for origins and causality has been the cornerstone of our approach, 
although we have emphasised the difficulty of establishing such a postulate. But have we 
succeeded, in our endeavour, in overcoming this notion of causality? How far have we been 
able to “follow” these forces that “conspire and translate”? Not so much and not so far as we 
would have liked. While we believe that we have more or less succeeded in establishing the 
multiplicity of ARPANET’s origins, it is likely that our narrative (that of time-sharing and 
resource-sharing) has sometimes played tricks on us, making us favour one causal path over 
others that were possible. The urge to search for causes is not easy to resist.  
The interaction between the individual and the collective 
Research on the new sociology of science and technology has long demonstrated the 
collective, social nature of the construction of scientific fact and technological innovation. 
The myth of the genius inventor, already challenged by the deterministic vision of innovation, 
has not survived attacks from the other side, demonstrating the social construction of 
techniques and the effacement of the inventor behind his network.  
And in our description of the translation processes, we have constantly stressed the collective 
nature of this adventure, the multiplicity of the actors and agents involved. Even without 
extending this notion to “non-humans,” as Latour does, the “human collective,” as a 
characteristic and condition of technological innovation, is therefore for us an asset, one 
which does not need revisiting.  
That is, unless it needs to be balanced by refocusing on the efforts of individual actors. 
Indeed, it seems to us that the role and singular nature of individuals have sometimes been 
overtaken by profit and loss in the social constructivist approach to innovation. While 
innovation is indeed a collective achievement, does this mean that individuals should be 
hidden in a fog where all individualities are blurred, whether by relevant social groups, social 
classes or even actor-networks?  
We may be reproached for going too far the other way and often having given too much 
emphasis to the role of individuals in the overall process. It is true that we have discussed at 
length the figures of Licklider, Engelbart, Roberts, Taylor and many others, each time 
emphasising the importance, singularity and specificity of their intervention in the emergence 
process.  
Should we see this as the (masked) return of the myth of the genius inventor? Does 
ARPANET owe everything to the talent of these network pioneers? Not at all, but by insisting 
on the role of very specific actors, we essentially wanted to emphasise a twofold conviction, 
both “moral” and theoretical.  
                                                
10 Veyne, P. (1978). Comment on écrit l’histoire. Suivi de Foucault révolutionne l’histoire. Paris : Seuil, 117.   
 
On a level that we will qualify as moral by simple convenience, we remain attached to a 
conception (inspired by Sartre) of an individual being fully and irreversibly responsible for 
his or her actions. And it seems to us that, in the field of scientific and technological 
innovation, this responsibility of specific individual actors, without necessarily having an 
ethical dimension, also plays a part and is ultimately decisive for the future of an event or 
process. […] But if we had left it at that, we would indeed have fallen back into the outdated 
idea of the “genius inventor.”  
We need to go further and, in order to fully recognise the role of a given individual actor, to 
try to show, beyond the usual qualifications, what made this role so important. And this is no 
more or less than the ability of these individuals to connect, form and interconnect (with) 
other entities. The key role of individuals in innovation processes is thus a strong theoretical 
consequence, in our opinion, of this associationist vision. It is because a given individual was 
able to attract the interest of others, forge alliances, neutralise opponents and mobilise allies 
that, at a specific moment, he or she played a more or less decisive role in the emergence 
process. Let us think in particular of the importance of Larry Roberts, in the crucial years 
1968-69, who was active on all fronts at once and “held” in his hands all the chains of actors 
and translations revolving around the ARPA Network project. If another IPTO official had 
not been so gifted in forming associations at that time, could the network have been created 
(at least as quickly and as robustly)?  
What makes individual actors so important in an approach based on the sociology of 
translation is not the “intrinsic qualities” of a particular researcher (talent, genius, audacity, 
etc.), but the application of these qualities to real-life situations, i.e. the ability of this 
researcher to associate, move and translate the collective. The “collective” should be 
understood here in the broad sense given by Latour and Callon, i.e. the collective of human 
and non-human associations. […]  
The individual factor is not only involved in the ability of some people to “hold” multiple 
chains of translations and actors. We have also tried to highlight the importance of personal, 
inter-individual relationships (which cannot be reduced to processes of “capture,” incentive or 
neutralisation). One of the pitfalls of an overly “strategic” conception of actors seems to be 
that it conceals the informal, personal and subjective dimension that characterises many 
relationships between the actors involved in innovation. On many occasions, the narrative is 
that of these intellectual complicities, these friendships – and also these enmities […] .11  
In short, the interaction between individual and collective efforts and the consideration of 
personal relationships between researchers, of their nature and intensity, seem to us to be 
major elements in the elucidation of a process of technological innovation.  
ARPANET treading the line between “crystal and smoke” 
Preparation vs uncertainty, formalisation vs informal spontaneity, normalisation vs chance, 
order vs disorder: the whole long process of emergence seems to take place between these 
two axes. Here, too, research on the sociology of translation has shown the profound 
uncertainty that prevails in the processes of innovation: the uncertainty of actors, their 
                                                
11 Examples include the friendly personal relationships between Licklider and Fano, Roberts and Kleinrock, Cerf 
and Crocker, and the less friendly links between Teager and McCarthy, Heart and Kahn, Taylor and Fano, etc., 
and their impact on the development of networks of actors. 
identity, their role, uncertainty about debates whose outcomes cannot be known at the outset, 
uncertainty about technical objects under construction which have not been stabilised. […] 
In our opinion, this generalised uncertainty can be expressed in three ways:  
- the role of real uncertainty, indeterminacy and chance in events, micro-processes and the 
trajectories of actors; 
- the role of informality (which is not exactly uncertainty, but which we nevertheless place 
under the same heading) in encounters, decisions and relationships between actors;  
- the interaction between, on the one hand, this uncertainty and informal character and, on the 
other hand, the aspects of preparation, organisation and planning of the process.  
The role of chance in the emergence process  
Whenever we have had the opportunity, we have emphasised […] the hazardous and 
uncertain nature of several key moments in this story: the arrival of Licklider at ARPA, the 
recruitment of Sutherland, the start of the MAC Project, etc. One could also consider, through 
the various examples we have described, that the history or future of the emergence process 
has more than once been played out in these unexpected encounters, in these conference 
feedback discussions,12 or in decisions taken at the flip of a coin (see Licklider).  
Without reducing innovation processes to a pleasant series of unpredictable events and 
anecdotes, it is nevertheless necessary, in order to better understand technological innovation, 
to fully reproduce this role of chance, as well as that of individuals. Only by patiently tracking 
the actors' trajectories can this element of chance, which can sometimes influence the future 
of the emergence process in an unexpected way, be highlighted.  
The role of informality in scientific networks  
Another major characteristic of the emergence of ARPANET, which we have discussed at 
length and often pointed out in the narrative, concerns the informal, spontaneous nature of 
many processes. Whether it is the functioning of ARPA and IPTO (the “ARPA style”), 
relationships between researchers, encounters and discussions, the technical notes themselves 
(formalised as RFCs), the crucial decisions taken after a brief improvised meeting (remember 
the Herzfeld agreement obtained by Taylor to develop the network project), the management 
of ARPA's Contractors or the internal functioning of the Network Working Group – the 
whole process is dominated by a remarkable flexibility, spontaneity, minimal organisation, 
even “informality.” That there is a certain “Americanness” here is undeniable.  
But there is nothing new under the sun, it will be said, and we have known for a long time that 
“science (or technology) in action” is more down to joyful disorder than the orderly 
arrangement of a French-style garden. 
                                                
12 Let us recall, for example, the importance of the discussion between Wes Clark and Larry Roberts after the 
Ann Arbor meeting, during which the idea of the IMP network was suggested. 
Here again, the reconstitution of micro-processes makes it possible to restore this dimension 
of the innovation process, which has been buried under more large-scale and retrospective 
causal explanations.  
One of the keys to ARPANET: the subtle interaction between spontaneity and preparation  
These dimensions, which characterise all innovation processes, are particularly significant 
here. And the fact that uncertainty and informality lie at the heart of the American machine is 
all the more interesting to highlight, first of all to counter the often simplistic representations 
of the “military-scientific-industrial complex,” but also because of this paradoxical balance 
between voluntarism and spontaneity that seems to characterise the entire process of 
ARPANET’s emergence.  
Because, while there is uncertainty and chance in the decisions and trajectories of actors, we 
are also struck by the incredible voluntarism of these same actors. 
The fact that the ARPA network was not formally decided, that this project was not the 
subject of a preconceived political, military or scientific plan, is undeniable, and hardly 
surprising. But its emergence can be attributed above all to the extraordinary energy and 
fierce voluntarism of a few individuals (Taylor and Roberts in particular) and their ability to 
plan the project, once the necessary forces had been assembled.  
This is perhaps what makes the difference between the emergence of ARPANET and that of 
other technical projects, resulting from political decisions and “plans” that were drawn up on 
paper even before having found the first ally.  
[…] It was only when a number of allies were convinced (ARPA’s Contractors), recruited 
(the BBN team, NWG students) and neutralised (ARPA and Pentagon leaders) that plans, 
schedules, contracts, deadlines and programmes could be established, then firmly organised 
and implemented. What would have happened if Roberts had done the opposite?  
Similarly, while the implicit rule in the ARPANET actor-network was to encourage flexibility 
in terms of operation, it was also based on efficient organisational methods, on delegation, 
autonomy and compliance with collective deadlines. 
In our opinion, these subtle (more or less deliberate) balances, this complex interaction 
between “chance and will” (rather than necessity), this combination of organisation and 
informality constitute one of the most plausible “causes” of the network project’s success. If 
an explanation is to be found, we would place it there, in the collective, technical, managerial 
and social “intelligence” that has been demonstrated by a number of individuals who were 
particularly gifted at building strong links between multiple entities and who were also given 
decisive political and financial support. The product of a combination of spontaneity, self-
organisation and proactive programming, ARPANET was soon able to benefit from a series 
of factors favourable to its development. The paradox between the resolute determination, 
even authoritarianism, of the IPTO’s leaders and the openness of the project (openness of 
technical content, applications and actors), a paradox that we have likened to the famous 
metaphor of “crystal and smoke,” remains one of the most striking features, in our opinion, of 
this emerging process.13  
A technical- or stakeholder-led approach? The role of technical factors 
ARPANET was based on packet switching; it was the first large-scale computer network to 
use this mode of data transmission. 
The importance of this technology and especially the conditions in which it was invented lead 
us to re-examine the respective roles of technical determinism and an internal, technique-
based rationale.  
A deterministic reading could attribute all the development processes of our current 
communication networks to this crucial invention of the 1960s […]  
But the conditions in which this technology was invented may also lead to another possible 
reading of this innovation, inspired by the influence of an internal, technique-based rationale. 
We have seen that several similar technical projects emerged at the same time: Paul Baran’s 
distributed network project, the experiment of the British NPL network by Davies and 
Scantelbury, and ARPANET. How can these coincidences be explained? Is there a dynamic 
for invention that is beyond the actors’ control? 
According to Leroi-Gourhan, techniques obey the laws of evolution, which the anthropologist 
has characterised by the concepts of technical trends and occurrences. […]  We can begin by 
speculating that the simultaneous invention of packet switching is a specific technical 
occurrence that is dependent and related to the circumstances and environments that 
surrounded it. But this technical occurrence, which should be analysed with the same 
meticulousness, rigour and erudition used by Leroi-Gourhan to study transport or 
manufacturing techniques, brings together and conveys universal components of a trend in 
distance communication techniques, which can be summarised by the threefold search for 
speed or efficiency, quantity (of both data to be transmitted and actors in communication, 
since packet switching transmission precisely allows several machines, therefore several 
people at the same time, to communicate) and accuracy (message splitting, fine packet 
routing, etc.).  
The notions of technical trend and occurrence, which express a degree of technical 
determinism, thus make it possible to see the invention of this mode of communication from a 
long-term perspective, as related to technical progress in remote communication, of which 
packet transmission represented the culmination.  
But how can we link this vision of the development of transmission techniques, based on 
internal laws and an evolutionary technique-based dynamic, with the sociology of translation, 
which shows us the uncertainty of innovation processes and the social construction of 
                                                
13 From this perspective, it would be interesting to compare the innovation process of Minitel with the 
emergence of the American network. Without a detailed knowledge of the internal processes that led to the 
launch of Minitel, we can summarise the major difference between the two innovation processes by referring to 
the terms used for their genesis: it would seem strange to speak of the “emergence” of Minitel (since this term 
has spontaneous connotations, implying self-organisation and natural movement), just as it would seem 
inappropriate to speak of the “launch” of ARPANET. 
techniques? This is a recurrent question, which is the subject of much of the debate raised by 
the translation model and contributes to some of the criticism levelled at it. Latour and Callon 
have often been accused of ignoring this internal technique-based dynamic, since technicality 
(as well as the scientific content of inventions) often seems to be obscured when considered 
alongside the interactions of actors and the construction of networks. […] 
Acknowledging the existence of an internal, technique-based dynamic, theorised by the 
notion of technical trends, does not mean that the emergence of ARPANET is the product of 
this dynamic. We prefer to see the simultaneous invention of packet switching transmission as 
the expression of a “research front,” a “reverse salient” as Thomas Hughes put it, which can 
be summarised as follows:  
- a handful of computer scientists in the 1960s “have the specific desire14” to make computers 
communicate with each other, for various reasons (ideological, technical, economic, etc.); 
- the existing technology at the time (circuit transmission) is not adapted to this need;  
- other modes of transmission are therefore necessary, but very few researchers and actors are 
convinced of this need (regardless of the innovation model, we should not lose sight of the 
pioneering, innovative nature of a few researchers, who were capable of identifying a problem 
that no one had yet seen before anyone else);  
- a new “research front” then opens up, on which a few isolated and separate teams and 
researchers (Kleinrock, Baran, Davies, etc.) are working; 
- under the effect of a complex set of translation operations, this research leads to the 
construction of a large-scale computer network.  
A new technical occurrence thus appears, the result of a variety of methods (see the various 
contributions of research by Kleinrock, Baran and Scantelbury-Davies), expressing a broader, 
universal and more long-term trend. 
While the notion of trend does not explain the emergence of an innovation, it resituates it in a 
broader time frame.  
The “Americanness” of ARPANET  
Is there such a thing as a “cultural determinism,” or a “social variability of innovations”? For 
Marc Maurice,15 it is impossible to isolate innovations from their societal context: workspaces 
that favour innovation are structured by the exchange and cooperation networks that are 
specific to a society. […]  
                                                
14 To use this very accurate expression by Jean-Claude Guédon (Guedon, J-C. (2000). La force de l’intelligence 
distribuée. La Recherche, no. 328,16). There is also a dimension of desire in this whole story that we have 
probably not sufficiently explained. 
15 Maurice, M. (1989). Les Bases sociales de l’innovation industrielle et du développement des produits, 
Comparaisons internationales et analyse sociétale, miméo LEST, in Vinck, D, Sociologie des sciences, op. cit., 
239-40.   
 
Two questions can summarise this issue of the cultural or social dimension of innovations: Is 
ARPANET specifically American? And does this Americanness explain its success? In other 
words, is the first computer network the result of American power? As much as the first 
question seems legitimate and well founded to us, the second seems more pernicious, because 
it inverts the terms of the explanation, suggesting that the result is in fact the cause.  
There is little doubt about the American cultural character of ARPANET. 
If all technical objects are a reflection of a world, we can suggest that this network 
exemplifies a broad swathe of American society in the 1960s. The complex ARPANET 
system, a typical “made in USA” product, seems to reflect the whole of American society in 
one way or another: whether through values (notably the belief in technological superiority, 
the importance of the “ideology of communication”), interests (political, scientific or 
strategic), geographical constraints (e.g. the importance of remote communication in a 
“continent country”), the practices of actors and management methods (“ARPA style,” 
flexibility, etc.), this Americanness is expressed in various ways and can under no 
circumstances be reduced merely to the utopia of communication, often considered as the 
typical American factor. We would suggest that the project management methods, the types 
of relationships established between the actors and the combination of informal methods and 
planning that we have sought to highlight are just as "American" as a belief in the virtues of 
communication. 
But what characterises “Americanness”? It is a difficult question, which we can only address 
in a roundabout way. 
It seems to us that the practices and values, the management methods and ideology, in short 
all the elements of ARPANET that are undeniably American can be subsumed in the more 
general notions of network and relationship and in the associationist metaphor that is perhaps 
at the core of a certain American (or Anglo-American) vision. In the views of information 
technology and society developed by Licklider, we can see the modernisation of an older 
philosophical tradition that is typically Anglo-American and dominated by associationism. 
We have already pointed out the path that links Vannevar Bush and the idea of hypertext, 
Norbert Wiener and cybernetics as a science of relationships, and Licklider and 
communicational computing. But this lineage can be traced further back to Hume, the 
philosopher of associationism. This influence of Anglo-American associationism extends 
beyond philosophy to language and literature, as Deleuze so clearly demonstrated […].16  
The “associationism” of language, literature, philosophy and cybernetics, of a certain 
conception of cognitive tools (Bush) and computer networks (Licklider), this primacy of 
relationships, associations and communication that is central to a specifically American or 
Anglo-American “design” was embodied in the emergence of this computer network. 
Whether in terms of its discourse and vulgate, impregnated with the ideology of networks, or 
its effective practices, based on the spontaneous efficiency of associations, the whole process 
of ARPANET's emergence condenses and thus expresses a profound Americanness.  
Any innovation process is therefore always embedded in a given society, of which it is the 
expression. And while other technical networks, based on the same technological principles, 
                                                
16 Deleuze, G., Parnet, C. (1996). Dialogues. Paris : Flammarion, 70.   
 
may have emerged in Europe or elsewhere, they were nevertheless very different in 
ideological, social, cultural and philosophical terms. Only the “technical part” escapes borders 
and social determinisms, being expressed in the notion of a universal “trend,” as we have 
noted above (see again the simultaneous invention in the United Kingdom, the United States 
and France of packet switching transmission).  
While the first question of ARPANET’s Americanness is therefore easily answered by a clear 
“yes,” the second is more complex and invites us to reconsider the different destinies of the 
three projects: why did the Americans succeed where the British, then the French, failed, 
when they had the same techniques and were virtually at the same level of conceptual 
advancement? […]  
All our work has focused precisely on showing that the key to the success of this innovation 
was the multiple successful translation operations implemented by the actors. If the 
networking project was successful (although we saw that at the outset nothing guaranteed its 
success), it was because of the ability of a few researchers and organisations to capture, 
interest and mobilise other entities, to build closely intertwined networks. The great strength 
of the ARPANET process comes, as we have repeatedly pointed out, from this extremely rare 
combination of voluntarism and spontaneity, control and flexibility, concentration of 
resources and decentralisation of tasks. ARPA successfully mobilised teams of initially 
reluctant researchers by making them actors in their own project. This undoubtedly explains 
much of the “American success” of this system, of what constitutes its strength.  
[…] it would be particularly interesting to be able to explore, in a “symmetrical” way, the 
conditions of emergence of ARPANET with those of the CYCLADES Project, another 
project based on packet switching transmission conducted in France at the same time. This 
project, launched in 1972 by the Délégation à l’Informatique, seemed destined for a future 
just as bright as its American cousin, but was finally shelved for socio-political reasons (the 
desire for hegemony of the telecoms administration, French-style centralisation, rivalry 
between telecoms and computing, etc.) that perhaps merely serve to demonstrate that the 
successful translation of an innovation process is beset with more difficulties in France. […] 
Unbalanced testimonies and difficulties following both sides of debates  
Finally, one last aspect of the corpus is worth noting, as it also poses a methodological and 
theoretical challenge. 
Indeed, while a corpus exploring traces of a past innovation process is inevitably dominated 
by the texts, writings and testimonies of the actors, it is also characterised by a second 
imbalance: an under-representation of the opponents of innovation.  
The actors and protagonists of innovation are, by nature and definition, easier to follow than 
their opponents, because they express themselves more both during the process and later on, 
especially when it has succeeded. As a result, recomposing the actors’ verbal traces is 
inevitably a biased process. For example, we did not have any statements, speeches or 
declarations from opponents of the network project or of time-sharing. Perhaps we did not do 
all the in-depth research needed in this area, but even if we could have found the positions 
taken by IBM, ATT or ARPA’s Contractors (which were initially hostile to the networking 
project), the imbalance between the traces of the actors and those of the opponents would still 
have been significant.  
The reason for this is fairly simple and can be explained by the translation model: it is not the 
opponents of an innovation who first feel the need to express themselves, to argue and to 
convince, through various articles and communications. As long as an innovation does not 
threaten them, opponents do not have to “engage” anyone to reject that innovation. More 
generally, inertia and technical conservatism do not require a voice: they just need to exist de 
facto and resist the projects and arguments of innovators, who are forced to defend their 
approach through writings of various sorts.  
What are the consequences of this imbalance in the traces of the debates that fuel the 
innovation process? One of them seems to us to be comparable to some extent to the case of a 
historian who only has access to the testimonies of a single category of actors in order to 
rebuild the history of an event […]. In the history of past innovations, the over-representation 
of the protagonists of a given innovation can lead to an equivalent dependence of the observer 
on these actors.  
But a more problematic consequence of this inevitable emphasis on the “actors’ discourse” (to 
the detriment of opponents or competitors) seems to us to lie in the contradiction with the 
third postulate of the translation model: the principle of symmetry. Set out in Bloor’s “strong 
programme,” the principle of symmetry invites the observer to consider innovations that 
succeed and those that fail, the supporters and opponents of a project, in a symmetrical and 
equal way. The study of technical debates must take into account, in equal measure, the 
arguments, definitions and points of view of both sides. But while this methodological 
principle, which has been proven to be effective, can be implemented for the study of ongoing 
processes, insofar as the observer can monitor all the actors involved (protagonists and 
opponents), what about the exploration of a finished process? Not only have many traces been 
lost; is there not also a strong chance that the victory cries of the “winners” will have drowned 
out the past arguments of those on the “losing” side?  
In short, this question of traces, of their nature, of the constitution and especially the 
composition of the research corpus leads us to point out the following three contradictions 
with regard to certain methodological principles of the translation model: 
- since the corpus was constituted a posteriori, it conflicts with or limits the principle of 
immanent follow-up of the process, without preconceived ideas;  
- since the corpus is essentially and almost necessarily composed of written traces, of the 
formalised and voluntary discourses of human actors, it limits the application of the principle 
of generalised human/non-human symmetry; 
- finally, since the corpus is mainly composed of statements by the very actors of innovation 
(to the detriment of those by opponents or losing competitors), the observer's viewpoint may 
be all the more directed, in contradiction with the principle of symmetry. […] 
For other forthcoming histories  
The history of information infrastructures has probably only just begun, and the exploration of 
the emergence and evolution of digital networks has at least three challenges ahead of it.  
First of all, we need to establish a solid basis of “raw” historical knowledge. On the one hand, 
we are far from having finished identifying and piecing together all the actors, agents and 
networks involved in ARPANET’s development. Other channels need to be highlighted. And 
on the other hand, the story of the emergence of other networks (UseNet, BitNet, CSFNet, 
etc.), their progressive connection within an Internet, the invention and dissemination of 
protocols – in short the whole continuation of the development of ARPANET and the 
emergence of the Internet in the 1970s-80s – has to be continued, even if we are now familiar 
with the broad lines. But can the type of history we have undertaken for the period upstream 
of ARPANET be pursued downstream, given the diversification and proliferation of actors 
and agents?  
We envision a second historical analysis project focusing on the long chains, the long life of 
information tools, particularly the intertwining of hypertext and computer network 
development.17 Sylvie Fayet-Scribe’s pioneering work,18 which presents in a vast synoptic 
table the “chronology of media, spatial devices and information retrieval tools,” shows the 
way forward for what could be a general, open, multiple history, integrating the diversity of 
historical lineages and trying to highlight the connections, interactions and relationships 
between histories that have been separated for too long (the history of communication 
techniques and that of information tools, for instance). The very development of tools and 
techniques related to the Internet serves as a powerful argument for this renewed historical 
perspective, since it has accelerated the phenomenon of convergence on all levels: 
convergence of techniques, tools, professions, professional sectors, challenges and, 
consequently, issues. We would suggest that a few decades from now, the history of methods 
for locating and searching for information may have been conflated with that of media and 
communication methods, since by that time the techniques will have merged fully.  
But this history of information devices and tools should also be linked to the history of ideas. 
It would be useful to connect the history of Anglo-American associationism with that of its 
pervasive influence on the emergence of networks (for Licklider) or on the intuitions of the 
founders of hypertext (for Bush). Associationist philosophy, hypertext, cybernetics, networks, 
tools for production, research and information processing and progress in computer 
technology are now intertwined in the explosion of cyberspace, sometimes forcing us to 
disrupt well-established boundaries. 
 
Finally, it seems inevitable that a third field of research will emerge to examine the conditions 
in which history is written and narrated in this era of widespread digitisation. How do 
digitisation processes affect the traces, documents and corpora of future histories of the 
present time and the tools for handling these traces? Given the increasing visibility and 
accessibility of a growing amount of information on the web and the emergence of a variety 
of tools for processing this information in detail, the very conditions of history as a narrative 
are changing profoundly, and it is difficult to measure this transformation. 
 
Indeed, new information infrastructures, as embodied in digital networks, are bringing about a 
paradoxical twofold movement. By focusing on the present time and fragmenting the 
space/time of past events, digital networks seem to deny the very possibility of history as an 
                                                
17 At the beginning of our work, we had planned to deal with this last aspect of the history of the Internet and to 
devote a significant part of our time to it, by retracing the history of hypertext, from Paul Otlet’s premonitions 
and Vannevar Bush’s reflections to the achievements of Ted Nelson and Douglas Engelbart (which were the 
only ones discussed). Unfortunately, this long history of hypertext has had to be abandoned, to our great regret, 
for reasons of time and space. 
18  Fayet-Scribe, S.(1997). Chronologie des supports, des dispositifs spatiaux, des outils de repérage de 
l'information. Solaris [online], December  no. 4.  
 
accumulation or sedimentation of traces, distanced from analysis. With a given event, its 
coverage and reception now coinciding, we may be entering a new era of historicity, as 
Bernard Stiegler points out: 
 
“Analogue and digital technologies are ushering in a new collective and individual experience 
of time that is a departure from the historical era, if it can be said that the latter is based on an 
essentially delayed time.19” 
 
Digital technologies themselves, the permanent and rapid evolution of which defies analysis, 
seem to erase their traces as they progress and send their own history into oblivion. 
 
But conversely, digitisation and the mass circulation of information of all kinds are constantly 
increasing the “material” nature of tomorrow’s histories. Never before has access to 
information, to data that was previously inaccessible, been so extensive and potentially 
unlimited. This inflation of collective memories is, in some respects, the guarantee of a 
continuation of history, even if the technical problems of preserving these memories will soon 
become a crucial issue. 
The Internet does not mark the “end of history” but certainly the renewal and transformation 
of its traces and the conditions of its writing. One of the most profound changes will probably 
concern the tools used to process these vast swathes of data. As glimpsed with the emergence 
of Computer-Assisted Sociology tools, the question of tools for researching, processing and 
displaying information is set to become a central concern in all social and human sciences.  
 
                                                
19 Stiegler, B. (1996). La Technique et le temps 2: La désorientation. Paris: Galilée, 137.   
 
